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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

been transferred by motion in the supreme court. 66 In the latter instance, CPLR 326(b) governs, and subsequent proceedings are had in
the supreme court "as if the action had been originally commenced
there and no process, provisional remedy or other proceedings taken
in the court from which the action was removed [is] invalid as the
result of removal." Hence, the civil court reasoned that if a similar
approach were not adopted when an identical motion was made before
it, a lesser measure of relief would be provided and the constitution67
ally directed procedure might rarely be utilized.
The New York City Civil Court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over a cause of action for money damages exceeding $10,000.68 Prior
to the constitutional amendment, unless an application for a transfer
was promptly made to the court with the requisite monetary jurisdiction,6 9 the practice was for the court in which the action was
brought to dismiss the complaint.70 However, Kemper illustrates that
the state constitution now gives the civil court the power to transfer
causes of action seeking damages in excess of its jurisdiction to the
supreme court rather than dismiss the complaint. Inasmuch as the
transfer can be effectuated sua sponte by the civil court, 71 the practi-

tioner is encouraged not to ignore a summons and complaint even
though that court patently lacks jurisdiction. 72 For, a defendant who
fails to serve his responsive pleadings may have no alternative but to
submit to the bothersome procedure of moving to open his default
in the supreme court.
ARTICLE

2-

LIMITATIONS OF

TimE

CPLR 203(e): Plaintiff permitted to add second cause of action arising
out of the same occurrence even though statute of limitations had run.
CPLR 203(e) declares that claims interposed by an amended
pleading relate back to the date of the original pleading unless the
825(a) & (b).
67 61 Misc. 2d at 10, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
66 CPLR

68 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1962).

See Taylor v. Goodrich, 284 App. Div. 928, 134 N.YS.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1954).
See Vigil v. Cayuga Constr. Corp., 185 Misc. 676, 54 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.),
aff'd, 185 Misc. 680, 55 N.YS.2d 909 (App. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 934, 58
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't 1945).
71 Cf. Keegan v. Queens County Jockey Club, 34 Misc. 2d 958, 228 N.YS.2d 729
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). On the other hand, CPLR 325 requires a motion by the
plaintiff. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 623 (1963).
72 Authority that the action must be commenced in a court that had jurisdiction
at least over the kind of action brought by the plaintiff is no longer controlling. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 623 (1963). Clearly, therefore, the rationale in
Kemper is not limited to claims in excess of the monetary jurisdiction of the city court.
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latter did not provide notice of the transactions or occurrences sought
to be proved pursuant to the amendment. This section is indicative
of the legislative intention 73 to afford the practitioner an opportunity
74
to liberally amend or supplement a pleading.
5 the court permitted the plaintiff
In Andrews v. Donabella,7
to
interpose a cause of action for property damage in addition to the
cause of action for personal injuries set forth in his original complaint76 despite the fact that the statute of limitations would have
barred the property damage cause of action had it been independently
commenced at the time the amendment was sought.7 7 Relying upon
CPLR 203(e), its underlying intent, and prior judicial construction
of the section, 78 the court concluded that the amendment was proper
since both claims arose from the same occurrence.7 9 It would, in fact,
be difficult to conceive of a claim more convincingly within the purview of 203(e).8 0
The effect of Andrews is to intensify the existing authority in New
York which permits an amendment to add a new cause of action and
73 The section was drafted to overcome the controlling case law of Harriss v. Tams,
258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932), where the court refused to relate the claim in an
amended pleading back to the date of the original pleading, holding that the statute
of limitations was tolled only as to those claims originally asserted. See SECOND REP. 50-51.
74 CPLR 3025(b) mandates that leave to supplement or amend a pleading shall be
freely given. See Town Bd. v. National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23, 277 N.Y.S.2d 872
(Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1967), afl'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286 N.Y.S.2d 122 (3d
Dep't 1968).
In drafting the rules, the Advisory Committee sought to posit "the widest discretion
possible" in the courts. FisaST REP. 78. In fact, both CPLR 203(a) and CPLR 5025(b)
were intended to permit even greater liberality than the Federal rule, FED. R. Cxv. P.
15(a),(c) (1964), after which they were patterned. See 1 W. K. & M.
203.30.
75 60 Misc. 2d 1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
76 The collision and negligence complained of occurred on January 2, 1964; the
original papers were served in October of 1969; and the order to show cause was filed
September 23, 1969. Memorandum in Support of Motion, Andrews v. Donabella, 60 Misc.
2d 1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
77 CPLR 214 prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for damage to property.
78 See Town Bd. v. National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23, 277 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. CL
Sullivan County 1967), aff"d mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286 N.Y.S.2d 122 (3d Dep't
1968); Ringle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1965);
Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
79 While the court characterized the claim for property damage as a new cause of
action, a strong argument could be presented for the proposition that the amendment is
merely an additional claim for damages. See H. PETERFREUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEw
YORK P~c'rcxE 572, 1285 (2d ed. 1968).
80The notice requirement of CPLR 203(e) is certainly satisfied by a complaint
alleging a collision caused by the defendant's negligence. The amount and type of property damage, severity of impact, and the facts determining liability would enter into
the action for personal injury in any event. Moreover, the defendants were fully aware
of the extent of damage to the plaintiff's car, and were in possession of photographs
of the damage. Affidavit & Order to Show Cause, Andrews v. Donabella, 60 Misc. 2d
1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
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thus overcome the otherwise harsh effect of the statute of limitations.8 '
These results are clearly justifiable, because in circumstances where
no prejudice to a defendant is evident, the statute of limitations is
satisfied by sufficient notice in the original pleading.
ARTICLE 3 -

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE

AN CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 303: Court declares personal delivery to be the only acceptable
method of service.
Pursuant to CPLR 303, the commencement of an action in New
York by one who is not himself subject to personal jurisdiction in the
state is an automatic designation of his attorney in the action, during
its pendency, as his agent for service of process. 8 2 The section also
contains a provision to the effect that service upon such an agent is
deemed to be service upon his principal only in any other action in
which the principal is a defendant and a party to the principal's original action is a plaintiff if the subsequent action, had it been brought
in the supreme court, would have been permitted as a counterclaim.8 3
However, the statute does not indicate what manner of service must
be employed. In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dupper,4 the
first department, in a per curiam opinion, recently held that since
the statute is silent on this point, only personal delivery will suffice;
substituted service, apparently employed in Twentieth Century-Fox,
will be deemed void.
Pre-CPLR case law would seem to support the court's conclusion.
81s ee, e.g., Ringle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1965); Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966).
Where a defendant has notice of an action for personal injuries arising from an automobile collision and is thereby apprised of possible liability for property damage, there
is no reason to allow the statute to continue running. In such an instance it is appropriate to apply the principle of laches; and, where no prejudice is shown, the amendment
is proper. 1 W. K. & M.
203.30.
82 Although it would seem that the section cannot be employed where the defendant
is, in fact, subject to personal jurisdiction when his agent is served, a federal district
court has held that no attempt at service upon the defendant is necessary in the first
instance. Miller v. Massa, 237 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The resultant agency relationship begins with the service of process and terminates
with entry of the final judgment in the action commenced by that service. Concourse
Super Serv. Station, Inc. v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 503, 226 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1962). Similar statutory schemes have been upheld as a proper exercise of the
state's jurisdiction. E.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
83 It has been recognized that this provision is expansive rather than restrictive, as
it permits the plaintiff to bring his action without being bound by jurisdictional monetary limits in the court in which the first action was brought. I W. K. & M.
303.07.
84 33 App. Div. 2d 682, 305 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Ist Dep't 1969).

